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Abstract: 
Much discussion of meaning by philosophers over the last 300 years has been predicated 
on a Cartesian first-person authority (i.e. ‘infallibilism’) with respect to what one’s terms 
mean. However this has problems making sense of the way the meanings of scientific 
terms develop, an increase in scientific knowledge over and above scientists’ ability to 
quantify over new entities. Although a recent conspicuous embrace of rigid designation has 
broken up traditional meaning-infallibilism to some extent, this new dimension to the 
meaning of terms such as ‘water’ is yet to receive a principled epistemological 
undergirding (beyond the deliverances of ‘intuition’ with respect to certain somewhat 
unusual possible worlds).  
     Charles Peirce’s distinctive, naturalistic philosophy of language is mined to provide a 
more thoroughly fallibilist, and thus more realist, approach to meaning, with the requisite 
epistemology. Both his pragmatism and his triadic account of representation, it is argued, 
produce an original approach to meaning, analysing it in processual rather than objectual 
terms, and opening a distinction between ‘meaning for us’, the meaning a term has at any 
given time for any given community and ‘meaning simpliciter’, the way use of a given term 
develops over time (often due to a posteriori input from the world which is unable to be 
anticipated in advance). This account provocatively undermines a certain distinction 




The Meaning of Meaning-Fallibilism  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 presents a broad-brush summary of 
„infallibilist‟ understandings of meaning influential since the early modern period. The 
next two sections contrast such understandings with Peirce‟s account – from which it 
is possible to tease out two „dimensions‟ of meaning. The first (discussed in  section 
2) is the meaning of a term or concept
1
 for a given group of people at a given time. 
Peirce‟s pragmatism suggests that this may be clarified by studying the expectations 
about the future which the group are led to form from hypotheses containing that term 
or concept. This pragmatist claim is distinguished from the verificationism which it 
superficially resembles. The second dimension of meaning on Peirce‟s account 
(discussed in section 3) consists in a term‟s use and development over time, insofar as 
representation (or, as Peirce puts it, “signification”) consists in an irreducibly triadic 
relationship between a sign, its object and further uses of the same sign to refer to the 
same object. (The fact that these two dimensions of meaning may come apart is in fact 
constitutive of meaning-fallibilism, it is suggested.) Section 4 draws out the 
consequences of this account for the relationship between semantics and ontology, and 
also defends it from charges of unworkable essentialism and incommensurability, 
making a distinction between the „immediate‟ (apparent) and the „dynamic‟ (real) 
object of any given term. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of how rigid 
designation should be understood in this original philosophical framework.  
1  Meaning-Infallibilism 
1.1  Some Recent Influential Conceptions of Meaning 
„The meaning of “meaning”‟ is one of the more fundamental philosophical issues. The 
concept of meaning seems to bear some logical connection with the concept of truth, 
insofar as the truth of a statement seems somehow dependent on its terms‟ meaning 
what they do. However, meaning seems to be a broader concept than truth, in that 
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statements which are patently untrue – such as “Cats have six legs” – can be perfectly 
meaningful. Meaning also seems to be something over and above reference, the 
difference in meaning between „The Morning Star‟ and „The Evening Star‟ being one 
of the most notorious examples of this. 
     Early modern philosophy was shot through with a dualistic metaphysics of material 
things (often referred to as „bodies‟) and minds (of which ideas were often considered 
to be „modes‟ or „features‟). Bodies and minds were viewed as entirely different 
substances by Descartes. Although later empiricist philosophers such as Locke and 
Hume sought a more scientifically respectable monism, they retained as the basic unit 
of logic and epistemology a notion of the idea which was very Cartesian in its 
„privacy‟ (that is, its location somehow „in‟ an individual mind), and also in its 
incorrigibility, such that I have first person authority about what the terms I use mean 
(which was thought by Descartes to form some sort of Archimedean point for 
grappling with the sceptic). Thus in the early modern period, the fact that „The 
Morning Star‟ and „The Evening Star‟ differ in meaning would have been accounted 
for by saying that although the two terms name the same heavenly body, they 
correspond to different ideas (these ideas being insufficiently “clear and distinct” for 
many minds to be able to discern their identical reference).  
     By the time of Frege, however, it was coming to be felt (due in part to Frege‟s own 
efforts) that this sort of understanding of meaning in terms of ideas was too 
psychologistic. Meaning was after all a logical concept, and so it was thought that it 
should be definable more objectively than in terms of the private, error-prone notions 
of individual minds. Thus, Frege wrote:  
The same sense is not always connected, even in the same man, with the same 
idea...A painter, a horseman, and a zoologist will probably connect different 
ideas with the name „Bucephalus‟ (Frege, 1952, p. 59). 
He therefore claimed that while „The Morning Star‟ and „The Evening Star‟ had the 
same referent (Bedeutung), each had a different sense (Sinn). This „Sinn‟, which Frege 
referred to as the mode of presentation of the reference, was an abstract object, 
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common to everyone who grasps the meaning of a term.
2
 However, while he gave up 
the privacy of the Cartesian model of meaning, he seems to have kept the 
incorrigibility. (For can I be wrong about the “mode of presentation” which I associate 
with a given term?) 
     Frege‟s account was extremely influential in twentieth century philosophy. 
However Quine – empiricist to Frege‟s rationalism – found Frege‟s notion of meaning 
as an intensional, and therefore abstract, object to be unacceptable within a naturalistic 
epistemology. He suggested doing away with the notion that a term or sentence might 
possess (or be otherwise associated with) an entity called „a meaning‟, in favour of the 
notion that two sentences might be synonymous – though he famously argued that the 
notion of synonymy itself is far from straightforward (Quine, 1953, pp. 23-32). 
Meanwhile, the later Wittgenstein also reacted against Frege‟s view of meaning as 
abstract object, giving birth to the view of meaning as „use‟ which has been influential 
in neo-pragmatist circles, amongst others. (Although Quine and Wittgenstein share a 
rejection of the idea that the meaning of a term or sentence might be some further 
object picked out by that term or sentence, they differ over the legitimacy of 
naturalistic methodology when applied to the study of meaning.) 
     Despite the popularity of these views, recently the idea that meaning might 
somehow be conceptually connected with truth has transformed itself into a rival 
theory of meaning, which identifies the meaning of a sentence with its “truth-
conditions”. In the 1970s, Donald Davidson proposed to formalise such an account of 
meaning analogously to Tarski‟s influential account of truth (replacing „means that‟ 
systematically by „is true if and only if‟). More recently, the analysis of meaning as 
truth-conditions has been understood more „metaphysically‟, in that the truth-
conditions for a particular sentence are understood to be the set of possible worlds in 
which it is true. A similar analysis has been proposed for singular terms, whereby the 






     However, in recent times the pendulum seems to be swinging back to the early 
modern view insofar as meaning is seen as corresponding somehow to the 
psychological states of individual speakers. Thus, Tim Crane has written: 
the general idea of reducing meaning to the psychological states of speakers is 
now widely accepted...at the time of writing, the philosophy of language has to 
some extent yielded the centre stage to the philosophy of mind–and the problem 
of meaning has become the problem of intentionality (Crane, 1995, p. 542).  
There is, however, an attempted hybridisation with the metaphysical possible worlds 
approach to meaning whereby it is envisaged that the ideas of individuals (or, to use 
more contemporary terminology, those individuals‟ mental contents) correspond to 
sets of possible worlds in some rather mysterious way. Influential recent approaches 
even produce a “two-dimensional modal logic” whereby one world-collecting 
dimension (the „secondary intension‟) corresponds to reference as it is usually 
understood, while the other dimension attempts to capture some of the apparently non-
referential residue of meaning (features such as indexicality, and merely epistemic 
possibility) in a further function across possible worlds.
4
 
     This brief survey of recent philosophical accounts of meaning is not meant to be a 
definitive study, but merely to present some of the variety of different positions 
recently held in this area. For the Peircean account of meaning differs from all of these 
positions.  
 
1.2   Positivism and its Heirs 
There exists a somewhat ambivalent attitude to meaning in the analytic tradition. On 
the one hand there is a hostility to it in an extensionalism which seeks to reduce 
meaning to reference. Quine, of course, is an important figure here (see for example 
Quine, 1980, p. 22). On the other hand, there is an arguable excessive focus on 
meaning through conceptual analysis, a form of detailed investigation which reached 
notorious heights in Oxford around the 1950s, and during the worst excesses of which 
the reference of the terms analysed seems to have been lost or elided. 
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     However, both of these approaches presuppose a deeper „picture‟ of meaning. This 
picture assumes a separation in principle between, on the one hand, the meanings of 
terms or concepts and, on the other hand, „facts about things‟ – which are thought of 
as being known a priori and a posteriori respectively. This distinction is arguably an 
heir of the classical empiricist distinction between (what Hume called) “Relations of 
Ideas” and “Matters of Fact”.5 As noted, the early modern understanding of the idea 
was very Cartesian, which entrenched the notion that one might possess first person 
authority with respect to the meaning of one‟s ideas. Coming at the same issue from 
another angle, it was important to empiricists that all necessity be analytic – true by 
virtue of the meanings of terms, and thus furthermore (given Cartesian first-person 
authority with respect to meaning) that all necessary truths be known a priori. This is 
why Hume was forced to adopt such a sceptical attitude towards causal necessity, for 
knowledge of the causes of effects such as, for instance, diabetes, is not gained by 
studying the meanings of terms such as „diabetes‟ and is also not to be had a priori. 
     Likewise, now it is widely held that a sharp separation may be drawn in philosophy 
between ontology, conceived as the question of what things exist, and semantics, 
conceived as the question of what things are referred to by our terms. The separation 
is often encountered in discussions of realism, for realism – it is often claimed – is an 
ontological rather than a semantic question.
6
 Semantics seems not to be explored as 
enthusiastically as ontology in contexts where the two are distinguished in this way. 
There seems to be a general feeling that, as opposed to the epistemic contact with real-
world things that is ontology, the meaning of our terms is a mere matter of our 
stipulating which real-world things will be assigned to the extension of any given 
term, and it does not matter how terms are used as long as both parties to a given 
debate stipulate that they will use them in the same manner. It is this sort of thinking 




1.3 A Posteriori Necessity and its Discontents 
In the 1970s, a new fallibilism about the meanings of terms (natural-kind terms, 
initially, but the moral has since been extended) entered the philosophical scene. Here 
is Putnam‟s now very famous version in “The Meaning of „Meaning‟” (Putnam, 
1975). In our world, the clear liquid which fills rivers and lakes possesses the 
chemical formula H20. Imagine, however, another world – “Twin Earth” – where the 
clear liquid which fills the rivers and lakes possesses a different chemical formula, 
enigmatically referred to as “XYZ”. The inhabitants of this world may refer to their 
clear liquid as „water‟, but their clear liquid just is not water, for water is H20. Despite 
the fact that until about 200 years ago no-one knew that water was H20, and everyone 
would have claimed that „water‟ meant “the clear liquid in rivers and lakes”, the true 
meaning of „water‟ is thought to have been discovered and the truth of “Water is H20” 
is thus thought to be an a posteriori necessity. 
     This result has been accorded many consequences in the philosophies of language, 
mind and science. Yet it is arguable that the abandonment of the old empiricist 
understanding of necessity whereby all necessity is analytic and a priori is still 
working itself out. At present, decisions about these a posteriori necessities seem 
mainly driven by what is referred to (somewhat vaguely) as “intuition”. Each 
individual philosopher is required to imagine Twin Earth and its clear, pourable, 
swimmable XYZ...and that individual is then expected to gain some kind of direct 
recognition that the term „water‟ should not be applied to XYZ. Here again arguably a 
notion of semantics as a relatively simple inquiry, certainly not one requiring any 
empirical investigation, is operating.  
     Yet subtle and difficult questions arise in this area. Just one issue is the distinction 
between what are known as indicative and subjunctive conditionals, for example: 
(I)  If XYZ is the stuff in oceans and lakes, then water is XYZ. 
(S)  If XYZ were the stuff in the oceans and lakes, then water would be XYZ. 
(I) is true, it is claimed, because it “treats the antecedent as actual” (Davies & 
Humberstone, 1980), and thus the reference of „water‟ is fixed by whatever we call 
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water in this world (be it H20, XYZ or PQR). (S) is thought to be false because it 
“treats the antecedent as counterfactual” (and, since water is H20 in this world, this 
fixes the proper reference of „water‟ in all other possible worlds, including the one(s) 
which the antecedent of the counterfactual refers to). It has been suggested (most 
notably by David Chalmers) that a term such as „water‟ has two separate dimensions 
of meaning– a “primary intension” and a “secondary intension” – which are invoked 
by (I) and (S) respectively.  
     There are many arguments about the finer points of meanings understood in these 
terms which seem to lack conclusive criteria for solving them. This is particularly true 
given that so much of the analysis is in terms of possible worlds of which we are not 
„inhabitants‟. Questions that have bothered this philosopher include: which terms 
designate rigidly and why? How do we know which features of a given thing to 
rigidify over? (Why „H20-hood‟ and not, say, some distinctive complex of 
phenomenological properties of water such as its pourability and colour?) A further, 
increasingly popular, question arising out of the rigid designation literature concerns 
the relationship between „metaphysical possibility‟ (which tracks rigid designation, 
and thus water‟s secondary intension) and conceivability, sometimes referred to as 
„epistemic possibility‟ (which tracks inessential descriptions under which water is 
known, and the expectations concerning water which are generated by those 
descriptions). The two are sometimes thought of as mapping the behaviour of 
subjunctive and indicative conditionals respectively. Moreover, if metaphysical and 
epistemic possibility are to be sundered, how can we (who lack a God‟s eye 
perspective) claim to be able to decide questions of metaphysical possibility at all? 
More precisely, how are we to know whether a statement such as “Water is H20” is 
metaphysically necessary and its negation merely epistemically possible, or whether it 
is merely epistemically possible and its negation metaphysically necessary? 
     Here, therefore, I would suggest that intuition is straining under the load of having 
to decide these questions unaided.
7
 The new fallibilism implicit in claims of a 
posteriori necessity is an important step towards a realist account of meaning, but it 
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needs to be backed up by a clear, principled epistemology for deciding questions such 
as the above. To this end, the next section will show how Peirce‟s pragmatism 
integrates the scientific method into the process of clarifying the meanings of our 
terms. 
 2  Meaning-Pragmatism  
2.1 The Pragmatic Maxim 
Pragmatism, insofar as it has been adopted by contemporary philosophers such as 
Putnam and Rorty, is treated largely as a theory of truth. However, in its Peircean 
form, pragmatism is first and foremost a tool for clarification of meaning. (Note that it 
is merely a tool for clarification, not a theory. Peirce‟s theory of meaning proper will 
be presented in section 3.) Peirce‟s pragmatic maxim states: 
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these 
effects is our whole conception of the object (Peirce, 1933, 1935, sections 5.2, 
5.402, 5.438). 
      For Peirce, if a concept is to be meaningful it must pertain to effects which we 
might observe in the world. It is not enough to refer to the world in some abstract 
sense in order to mean something by our statements, we must be in direct 
experimental contact with it. An example of the maxim in use which Peirce provided 
in his famous early paper “How to Make our Ideas Clear” is the meaning of „hard‟. 
When we use this term, he claims, we mean that the objects we apply it to will resist 
pressure, not break when struck, and a whole manner of similar effects, and there is 
nothing else that we mean.  
     Cheryl Misak has pointed out that the pragmatic test of meaningfulness is properly 
applied to terms embedded in propositions, rather than in isolation, and that these 
propositions are hypothetical in character. Thus, when we inquire into the 
meaningfulness of „hard‟, we ask what expectations we would draw from hypotheses 
of the form “X is hard” (Misak, 1991, p. 11). In this way the meaning of a term for any 
  
11 
given language-community at any given time is most usefully clarified via the series 
of hypothetical conditionals containing the term which they would construct in various 
contexts. (The reason the qualification „most usefully‟ has been added in „most 
usefully clarified‟ will now be explained.) 
     Misak adds that the pragmatic maxim is not intended to replace more traditional 
methods of clarifying meaning, such as analysis and the framing of definitions or 
necessary and sufficient conditions. Rather, Peirce presents the pragmatic maxim as a 
“third grade” of meaning-clarity, which was introduced to the intellectual world by the 
scientific method, and which philosophy is now poised to benefit from. Peirce claims 
that the first grade of clarity with respect to a term such as „hard‟ consists in being 
able to identify those objects which are hard – without necessarily being able to give 
reasons for doing so. The second grade of clarity consists in one‟s being able to frame 
a verbal definition of „hard‟ – the sort of definition that might be found in a dictionary 
(Misak, p. 13). The third grade, however, assigns future expectations to hypotheses 
containing the term in question. (For instance, if a particular table is hard, then one 
will be able to put a plate on it without the plate falling through.) Whether any given 
conditional of this type is true can only be investigated a posteriori. Misak points out 
that a contrast exists in Peirce‟s philosophy between “nominal” and “pragmatic” 
explications of a term, which correspond to the second and third grades of meaning-
clarification respectively (Misak, pp. 35-8). 
2.2 A Posteriori Meaning-Precisification 
T. L. Short has urged that despite the fact that the first and second “grades” of 
meaning-clarification never disappear from the Peircean philosophical toolkit, it is 
essential for philosophers to benefit from the third grade. As a paradigm of using the 
second grade alone he offers G.E. Moore‟s vision of philosophy as the search for 
“definitions”. The problem with this methodology, he argues, is that one can never 
attain clarity greater than that of the concepts one is using to frame the definition. 
Most people have had the experience of looking up a word in the dictionary and being 
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led in a frustrating circle of interdefinitions. On the other hand, Short argues, the 
pragmatic maxim helps one attain greater clarity using concepts of lesser clarity: 
A person who can distinguish a hot from a cold stove has some idea of 
temperature, but not so clear a one as he who can explain the difference 
between heat and temperature and show you how to measure degrees of 
temperature. But would we have arrived at the latter idea without having begun 
with the former? (Short, 1997, p. 291). 
     Short describes the way in which scientists used empirical investigation in tandem 
with the thinking underlying the pragmatic maxim to arrive at a clearer meaning for 
„heat‟. When the thermometer was first invented, its operation was poorly understood. 
However it did provide a clear, measurable set of expectations (with respect to the 
highly sensitive rise and fall of the mercury bar) which obviously had something to do 
with the heat of the thermometer‟s surroundings. The concept of temperature was 
aligned with these precisely measurable expectations and then it became possible to 
investigate temperature itself and, in the process, to discover how the thermometer 
worked. In this way, the concept of heat, which had been a vague secondary quality 
concept (having to do with such things as how one felt when near the fire) received a 
scientific precisification in the concept of temperature. The same point may be made 
with respect to the concept of water and the concept of H2O. The latter precisifies the 
former. (Note that on this account it precisifies the concept of water rather than 
identifying what water is. This distinction is important.) 
     Such experimental or a posteriori clarification of meaning is crucial to Peirce‟s 
realism. For Peirce, realism with respect to any given thing means that one may be in 
error about that thing (Peirce, 5.430, 5.152). One might protest that „heat‟ and 
„temperature‟ (and also „water‟ and „H2O‟) are in fact terms corresponding to different 
concepts, and what has really happened is that the former has been superceded by the 
latter in scientific contexts (while continuing to be used in ordinary language). Yet this 
seems not to do justice to the fact that the two concepts share so many expectations 
(such as that if it is healthy for me to drink eight glasses of water a day then it is 
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healthy for me to drink eight glasses of H2O a day), and also the way in which, as 
Short points out, our having the former concept somehow led us to discover the latter, 
in a process of refinement that was far from clean or discrete. It therefore seems more 
accurate to say that the new concepts „grew from‟ the old. 
     It is also worth saying something about this use of the term „precisification‟ and its 
related claim that the meanings of our concepts or terms are, as they stand, vague. 
There exists a huge literature on vagueness, presenting many subtly differing analyses 
of it. Susan Haack, however, noting that vagueness may be construed paradigmatically 
as “uncertainty about the applicability of a predicate”, has made a useful distinction 
between two different possible understandings of that phrase:  
(1) The qualifications for being F are imprecise. 
(2) The qualifications for being F are precise, but there is difficulty in 
determining whether certain subjects satisfy them (Haack, 1996, p. 110). 
Peirce‟s analysis of meaning actually allows an interesting middle position here. At 
any time our understanding of our terms‟ “qualifications” is genuinely open. It is not 
merely the case that (to give an example Haack herself uses to illustrate (2)) we are 
unable to make requisite measurements. For instance, it was unknown in the medieval 
period that it was a qualification for a fluid‟s being water that it possess the chemical 
formula H2O, it was not merely that the chemical equipment was not available to do 
the requisite tests. This suggests, at any time, vagueness in the sense of (1). Yet over 
time the qualifications for applying any given term are discovered in a realist manner 
that suggests (2) rather than (1). Water‟s chemical formula was not laid down by 
human fiat. 
     However there is no end-point of absolute precision to this process of discovering 
further qualifications.
8
 Thus the „precise‟ in Haack‟s distinction needs disambiguating 
as between reference to a process (objective or realist precisification, which is always 
possible according to Peirce) and a state (some putative point of absolute precision, 
which is not available, according to Peirce). The replacement of the latter by the 
former in a naturalistic philosophy of language is something of a theme of this paper. 
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2.3   Pragmaticism and Logical Positivism Distinguished 
An important effect of conscientious application of the pragmatic maxim, Peirce 
claimed, is to banish those notorious philosophical posits, “things-in-themselves”, 
from consideration as meaningless. If we cannot conceive a way in which a given 
object of our thought would make a difference in experience, then it is pointless for us 
to imagine that we are so much as thinking about it. It may however be objected: in so 
banishing things-in-themselves from consideration, are we not committing ourselves 
to a crude scientistic positivism? We need the notion of things-in-themselves, it will 
be argued, to stop us from ruling as meaningless terms which do not feature in our 
notoriously limited stock of concepts.  
     However, note that all Peirce says is that our conception of the effects of the object 
to which we are applying the pragmatic maxim is our whole conception of the object, 
not that our conception of its effects is the only possible conception of the object. 
Something which appears to be an effectless thing-in-itself at some stage in the 
development of human thought may be recognised to have measurable effects once 
our thinking becomes clearer and we know more. Peirce offered the chemical 
composition of stars as an example of such a shift (which occurred in his lifetime) 
from a matter which was supposedly closed to any possible observation to a matter 
which was, in fact, known (Peirce, 1.138). 
     Thus, along with Peirce‟s pragmatic maxim, which urges us to clarify the meanings 
of our concepts via their conceivable effects, goes a thesis about the indeterminacy of 
meaning according to which we never know the full meanings of our terms. In fact, a 
large part of the progress of science occurs through scientists‟ clarifying and extending 
the meanings of scientific terms (such as „force‟ or „electricity‟) by hypothesising 
observable effects in particular situations with respect to which the current 
understanding of the term is indeterminate, making the requisite observations and 
adjusting the terms‟ meanings. This process of a posteriori discovery, of course, just is 
scientific experiment. Thus, Peirce wrote: 
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How much more the word electricity means now than it did in the days of 
Franklin; how much more the term planet means now than it did in the time [of] 
Hipparchus. These words have acquired information...(Peirce, 7.587)
9
. 
Once it has been recognised that our apprehension of the meanings of our terms is so 
limited, it should be evident how unwise it would be to make judgements that the only 
terms that are meaningful may be selected from those that are currently meaningful for 
us. This, then, is a further aspect of „meaning-fallibilism‟. Not only do meanings 
develop, in ways not able to be predicted a priori, but further development is always 
possible. 
     Having presented the essential indeterminacy of meaning according to Peirce, it 
should now be evident that Peircean pragmatism and logical positivism, far from 
being philosophical kin (as was suggested by their mutual rejection of the “thing-in-
itself”), are deeply opposed. For – at least in the early, boisterous, verificationist phase 
of the movement – a new and complete determinacy with respect to the meanings of 
our terms was just what the logical positivists saw themselves as providing, after 
which decisions could be made once and for all about which suburbs of the city of 
philosophy were „meaning-less‟, and those suburbs could be razed. (Logical 
positivists did of course move on from this. For example, Carnap in Testability and 
Meaning (1950) presents only a „partial interpretation‟ of scientific terms into 
observation statements which correspond to experimental results. But by this stage 
Carnap explicitly repudiates verificationism as well.) 
     Consider for example Moritz Schlick‟s forthrightly named “The Turning Point in 
Philosophy”. Schlick writes that it used to be thought that philosophy provided 
answers to questions (which he refers to disapprovingly as “metaphysical questions”). 
However, the true role of philosophy has been discovered, and this is solely to show 
which, if any, entirely determinate meanings our statements have: 
...the concept of probability or uncertainty is simply not applicable to the acts of 
giving meaning which constitute philosophy. It is a matter of positing the 
meaning of statements as something simply final. Either we have this meaning, 
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and then we know what is meant by the statement, or we do not possess it, in 
which case mere empty words confront us, and as yet no statements at all 
(Schlick, 1930/31).
10  
As we‟ve seen, Peirce, on the other hand, argued that all our statements are essentially 
indeterminate in their meaning – there are always further „qualifications‟ to be 
discovered for any given concept. Yet despite this essential meaning-indeterminacy, 
our statements, contra Schlick, are not “empty words”. To fully understand how 
meaning-determinacy might be a matter of degree rather than the yes-no affair 
conceived by Schlick – and indeed to understand Peirce‟s theory of meaning proper – 
one needs to understand Peirce‟s distinctive philosophy of language (which he thought 
of as a theory of signs), and this is the subject of the next section. 
3  Meaning and The Triadic Sign. 
3.1  Representamen, Object and Interpretant 
Philosophers have traditionally devoted much attention to the study of language and of 
thought and not this wider topic of signs. Yet for Peirce such a focus was more 
naturalistic, for the formal conditions exhibited by signs were usefully identifiable not 
only across human mentality, but in the natural world as well. Somewhat notoriously, 
Peirce invented a great deal of his own rather forbidding terminology in this area. 
However Peirce believed most traditional philosophical discussions of language had 
been conducted in ordinary language terms which lacked the level of rigour (or indeed 
clarity, in his second and third senses) which this very difficult area of philosophy 
required. 
     For Peirce a sign is any token, either linguistic (such as a word, a phrase, a 
sentence) or non-linguistic (such as a gesture, a picture, or even a spot on a butterfly‟s 
back) which partakes of a certain formal structure. The most important thing to note 
about the Peircean sign is that its structure is irreducibly triadic. A sign consists of not 
just the Quinean “word and object”, but also what Peirce calls an “interpretant”. An 
interpretant consists in further uses of the same sign to represent the same object. This 
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is just to say that a word (or gesture, picture...etc) must represent an object such that 
this representation is capable of being understood, as this further understanding will 
consist in the generation of further signs. (As Peirce puts it, “a sign is not a sign unless 
it translates itself into another sign in which it is more fully developed”(Peirce, 
5.594)). It may be objected that this sets up an infinite regress. However, the aim here 
is not to provide an explication of understanding but only its formal structure. 
     For instance, if I breed a charming new variety of cat and give it the name „Felis 
Gorgeous‟, that name (which Peirce calls the sign‟s representamen) will operate as a 
sign by virtue of the new breed (which is the sign‟s object) but also, crucially, there 
will be no new sign generated unless other people pick up on my new name and start 
to use it themselves. These responses to my use of the sign in further sign-uses 
occurring in a variety of contexts constitute the interpretant of my new sign. They will 
explore and develop the meaning of my sign beyond what I originally conceived by it. 
For example, they will work out how the breed behaves under continued breeding, 
what its genetic makeup is, and how the various individuals that make up the breed 
behave in day to day life. These facts are part of the meaning of „Felis Gorgeous‟, for 
Peirce, just as facts about, say, the way electrons behave in experimental situations are 
part of the meaning of „electron‟. The constant need for new interpretants if a sign is 
to „live‟ thus provides the formal structure of the constant development in meaning 
which is the keystone of Peirce‟s fallibilist meaning-realism. 
3.2 Meaning and the Interpretant 
Compare Peirce‟s triadic account of semiosis with the idea that the meaning of any 
given term or concept (or indeed, any proposition) is some object (whether concrete or 
abstract) picked out by that term or concept (or proposition). Call this the mistake of 
conflating meaning with reference. As noted in section 1, the later Wittgenstein 
reacted against such a view. In Philosophical Investigations he described it (in a 
manner which exaggerates it, but instructively) as follows: 
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Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the 
object for which the word stands (Wittgenstein, 1953, §1).  
Given this view‟s dyadic structure, whereby meaning is solely a matter of a word and 
its corresponding meaning-object, it is hard not to conclude that meanings are utterly 
determinate. For this is our usual conception of objects, patterned after our conception 
of physical objects. 
     For Peirce on the other hand, the meaning of a sign may be identified not with the 
sign‟s object but with its interpretant.11 That is, the meaning of my term „Felis 
Gorgeous‟ is not some shadowy abstract object over and above the breed itself, but it 
is what the sign does – how it spreads and grows (if, indeed, it does spread and 
grow).
12
 It is not an object but a (potentially endless) process. In this way, then, 
reference and meaning are distinguished from one another in an original manner. 
Interestingly, this processual approach to meaning has been converged on 
independently within the AI literature by a rival paradigm to classical 
computationalism known as „interactionist constructivism‟ (Christensen & Hooker, 
2001, Collier, 1999, Collier & Muller, 1998). This theory aims to replace traditional 
understandings of cognition in terms of determinate brain states which mediate 
between mind and world by virtue of their meaning, by a model of intelligence as a 
direct, constantly evolving relationship between mind and world. According to this 
account, intelligence consists not in accessing information (or even algorithms) 
encoded in the brain, so much as skilfully managing interactions with the world in real 
time: in “adaptive interaction rather than internal computation”. 
     Peirce‟s framework is congenial to this account in echoing its dynamic character, 
and also insofar as it fails to posit any entity which may be designated „the meaning‟ 
of a term at any given time. Also worth highlighting is the way in which according to 
interactionist constructivism the ongoing interaction process itself generates 
information which feeds into further interactions – a process which cannot be 
modelled by any algorithm: 
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[This framework] makes it possible for systems to flexibly refine and solve 
initially vague problems. Such vague problems are ubiquitous for living 
creatures because their root problems are viability problems of which they have 
no understanding...it is the essence of survival that there should be processes 
that both guide action and improve the capacity to guide action while doing so. 
However [classical computationalism] subverts this perspective because, among 
other things, it deals in algorithms whose precision assumes explicitly defined 
problems to which they are eternal, optimal, solutions (Christensen & Hooker, 
§1). 
The reflexive character of the Peircean sign process – according to which any 
interpretant generated by any given sign consists of further signs, subject at any time 
to previously unanticipated interpretation – is very suggestive in this regard. 
3.3 Meaning, the Interpretant and the Pragmatic Maxim 
It is worth noting, however, that rather than stating that meaning is the interpretant 
(simpliciter), it is more exact to say that the concept of the interpretant is the sort of 
scientific precisification of the ordinary language concept of meaning which is made 
possible by the pragmatic maxim. Peirce‟s concept of the interpretant raises the 
concept of meaning to the third level of clarity, for through it Peirce makes the claim 
that if a sign is meaningful then it will generate further signs in the appropriate 
context. This provides a clear (if highly general) expectation for the hypothesis that a 
statement is meaningful.  
     So, for example, a noticeboard which says “Danger: crocodile-infested waters” (a 
meaningful group of symbols) is likely to produce observable behaviour in those who 
come across it, whereas a sign containing the meaningless string of symbols 
“DGHYTRESP” will not do so. Such worldly expectations are not provided by the 
early modern notion of meaning as a private “idea” in the individual‟s head, nor by the 
Fregean notion of meaning as the “mode of presentation” of a given denotation, nor by 
the notion of meaning as truth-“conditions” (of either the Davidsonian or the possible 
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world variety). So here we may observe what Peirce called the “experimentalists‟ 
view of assertion” (one definite description he used for his pragmatism) being put to 
work in philosophy by him in a useful way. 
     Where section 2 focused on the meaning a term has for a group of people at a given 
time, this third section has explored the meaning a term can be said to have 
simpliciter. A full understanding of this requires an understanding of Peirce‟s 
semeiotic, insofar as he identifies the meaning of a sign with its interpretant – its 
development in use in a variety of contexts. This development often cannot be 
predicted from the expectations the term‟s users have at any given time. Such 
unpredictability is, of course, the essence of a posteriori discovery, and acceptance of 
it goes hand-in-hand with fallibilism (and thus realism) with respect to the meaning of 
our terms. 
 4  Transcending the ‘Meaning-Fact Distinction’ 
4.1  A Priority and A Posteriority Revisited 
An understanding of meaning was outlined in §1 which assumes a separation in 
principle between, on the one hand, the meanings of terms or concepts and, on the 
other hand, facts about things – which are thought of as being known a priori and a 
posteriori respectively – and which is tied to the view that a sharp separation may be 
drawn in philosophy between semantics and ontology. Peirce redraws this landscape 
substantially. Meaning is an  a priori affair for Peirce in that the meaning of a term for 
any given users of the term is the expectations it leads them to project into the future 
from hypotheses containing that term (for example, the meaning of „hard‟ for us is a 
whole raft of expectations concerning the behaviour of hard objects). However, as we 
have seen, the meanings of our terms also develop. They are clarified a posteriori, 
through the generation and testing of defining expectations. This a posteriori 
clarification however, then leads to further a priori expectations with respect to 
hypotheses containing that term.  
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     The clarification of meaning (or, in Peircean terms, the development of signs) is 
thus a cyclical process,
13
 and the distinction between a priori (features of meaning) 
and a posteriori (facts) is for Peirce not a distinction between distinct bodies of 
knowledge or belief. Rather, whether any particular belief is held a priori or a 
posteriori can depend on the surrounding context of inquiry. Consider for example the 
„fact‟ that electrons have a negative charge. At one stage in the development of 
physics this was an open question, and the fact was discovered in a posteriori 
experimental fashion. However, it is now so entrenched in physical theory that it is 
arguably part of the very meaning of „electron‟, such that if we were to contradict this 
feature it seems that (as with any essential property) we would not be talking about 
electrons any more but about something else. 
     It might be objected, however, that now the concepts of meaning and truth have 
been run together. If every fact about electrons becomes part of the meaning of 
„electron‟, then does this not commit Peirce to an unworkable essentialism14 according 
to which no claim is meaningful that is not factual? A related objection is that this 
account will generate unworkable incommensurabilities. Will it not follow that 
wherever two people wish to ascribe differing properties to a given entity they are 
talking about different things and so no genuine disagreement is possible?
15
 It has 
already been noted that we need to open some logical space between meaningfulness 
and truthfulness. How is this to be done under Peirce‟s account? It will be argued in 
the next section that – once again – the solution to these problems is provided by the 
essential indeterminacy of meaning. 
4.2   Meaning and the Distinction between Immediate and Dynamic Object 
It was noted that it is traditional to make an in-principle separation between „facts 
about meanings‟ and „facts about things‟, and to suppose that any given piece of 
knowledge belongs irrevocably in one or other of these camps. Call this the Static 
Model of meaning. By contrast, we have noted that according to Peirce‟s account of 
signification there is no extra abstract object – the meaning, sense or intension – 
picked out by a sign. All that is referred to by a sign is the sign‟s object. However, a 
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sign‟s interpretant consists in the fact that other people use the same sign to refer to 
the same object. Through these further uses, Peirce claimed, the object of any given 
sign is continually refined, made more determinate. (It is important to note that what is 
made more determinate is what the object of a given sign is. The object itself is not 
somehow rendered more determinate by our inquiring into it.
16
) 
     Thus Peirce distinguishes between the Immediate Object, or the object as it appears 
to us (which he refers to enigmatically as a “hint”), and the Dynamic Object, which is 
the object we are referring to as it really is (Peirce, 4.536, 8.314, 8.343). To return to 
our original example, the Immediate Object of the term „water‟ consists in such 
features as colourlessness, odourlessness and pourability, while the Dynamic Object 
of the term is at least approached through the discovery that water‟s chemical formula 
is H20. The Immediate Object is more vague than the Dynamic Object, and inquiry, 
via the process of meaning-precisification described in section 2, is largely a process 
of bringing the objects of one‟s thought closer and closer to their Dynamic Objects. 
This only happens, however, due to the role the interpretant is playing in the sign-
relation. For if a given sign ceases to be used then the object of that sign ceases to be 
refined. For example, if people (for some fanciful reason) had irrevocably ceased 
talking about water in the Middle Ages, then the discovery that water is H20 could 
never have been made. 
      This essentially developmental character which underlies all sign use, then, 
renders Peirce‟s a Dynamic Model of meaning. Note that, unlike Kripke‟s “sceptical 
solution”, to the rule-following problem (Kripke, 1982), and related forms of 
antirealism that suggest that the meaning of a term is entirely constituted by a given 
community‟s “assertability conditions”, Peirce‟s model allows that the rules for 
deriving future possible expectations from any given sign can be overwritten via 
experimental interaction with the sign‟s (Dynamic) object. At the same time, however 
(somewhat paradoxically) the pragmatic maxim teaches that that object is only known 
through its defining expectations. This allows that the Immediate Object of any given 
sign might be not just vague but also partially erroneous
17
. For example, in the Middle 
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Ages water was erroneously conceived to be a fundamental, indecomposable element, 
but despite the fact that water has now been decomposed into hydrogen and oxygen, it 
would be counterintuitive to deny that the Medievals were talking about water when 
they made claims such as that the ocean is full of water. 
     Amongst the many theories of reference currently on offer, there is little scope for 
modelling such a dynamic self-correcting interaction between a term and its referent 
(or in Peirce‟s terms, between a sign and its object). As noted, the turn towards rigid 
designation and a posteriori necessity has opened up a degree of fallibilism with 
respect to the meaning of terms such as „water‟. However, the correction presupposed 
by such a posteriori necessity is usually treated as a very all-or-nothing affair (whereby 
the chemists who discovered the chemical formula H2O are conceived to have 
discovered once and for all water‟s very essence) rather than the process of continual 
refinement modelled by Peirce‟s account – which in its greater generality is more 
powerful.  
     Also, the fact that the feature with respect to which the meaning of the term is 
corrected must be treated as a necessity is not without its problems. For instance, with 
respect to natural kind terms such as „water‟, it creates „metaphysical‟ necessities18 
that are not logically necessary. For no logical contradiction seems implied by the 
statement “Water is XYZ”, despite that statement‟s (alleged) necessary falsehood. 
This new category of modality has begun to be dutifully explored in the literature 
(Jackson, 1997, Shoemaker, 1998, Yablo, 2000) . However, given that metaphysics 
concerns itself with fact (albeit fact of a highly general nature), what sort of fact is it 
that water is necessarily H2O? It doesn‟t seem to be any physical necessity, like the 
law of gravitational attraction. Somewhat ironically, this new category of necessity 
recapitulates scholastic philosophy, insofar as a distinction was made by Duns Scotus 
between the “logical universal”, the “metaphysical universal” and the “physical 
universal” (Engel-Tiercelin, p. 57). This raises the question the early moderns raised 
against much medieval philosophy: is such a byzantine set of distinctions really 
necessary? Or is „metaphysical necessity‟ a reification of something better understood 
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in processual, semiotic terms (such as, perhaps, our need always to retain sufficient 
aspects of our signs‟ Immediate Objects to coherently refine our understanding 
towards their Dynamic Objects)? 
     At any rate, for Peirce the answer to the problem of avoiding essentialism and 
distinguishing appropriately between meaningfulness and truthfulness lies (once 
again) in the indeterminacy of meaning. Insofar as the meanings of our concepts are 
always indeterminate, there is no end to the interpretation required to winnow their 
Dynamic from their Immediate Objects. In that sense, then, the meanings of our 
concepts will always in principle outrun our factual knowledge, for as we have seen, 
the overall meaning possessed by any given sign just is its future development in the 
form of the interpretant.  
     It might be objected that this may account for the meaningfulness of statements 
concerning matters we don‟t yet know about, but what about statements which we 
know are false, but are still meaningful: for example the aforementioned, “Cats have 
six legs”? Surely no possible future development of the concept of cathood could 
deliver such a result? Here one must be careful not to underestimate the stringency of 
Peirce‟s fallibilism. Though the possibility that cats might turn out really to have six 
legs (due, for example, to some rare and strange optical illusion) is so unlikely that we 
need not waste time investigating it, still we should leave it open, and it is on this that 
the statement‟s meaningfulness depends.19 
5  Conclusion 
It was remarked at the start of this paper that a recognition that some questions to do 
with meaning are a posteriori has entered the analytic tradition in the last few decades, 
but that this recognition is not backed up the sort of epistemology (for deciding 
questions such as when to rigidly designate and over which features of the object in 
question) appropriate to an a posteriori inquiry. Rather, the tradition retains an appeal 
to „intuition‟ more appropriate to meaning understood in the older sense of Cartesian, 
first-person authority  
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     Peirce‟s account points the way towards providing such an epistemology. Through 
the pragmatic maxim he suggests that the clearest meaning which any given term has 
at any particular time is the set of hypothetical conditionals containing the term which 
its users would construct to predict experienceable effects. In this way he integrates 
the scientific method into his account of what meanings are and the way they develop. 
The issue with respect to „water‟ and „H20‟ has been explicated in Fregean terms as a 
gap between a property and the “mode of presentation” of that property (Shoemaker, 
1998). The pragmatic maxim closes the gap between a property and its mode of 
presentation. Clarifying the meaning of any concept consists in exploring the 
expectations one may form using the concept in a variety of contexts. In other words, 
„H2O-ness‟ is a mode of presentation for water just as pourability is – its defining 
expectations merely pertain to more specialized (often laboratory-controlled) 
situations. In this way Peirce does not sunder metaphysical from epistemic possibility 
so radically as to render metaphysical possibility accessible only to an „intuition‟ 
whose origin and truth-conditions can only be mysterious. 
     The overall meaning of a term, however, consists in the development which takes 
place in its defining expectations over time as, through interaction by users of the term 
with the world and its recalcitrance, those expectations grow and change. If there is no 
growth and change, there is no genuine sign and thus, no meaning. 
     What of rigid designation? Viewed from within the framework sketched in this 
paper, the phenomenon corresponds to an understanding that we are much more 
reluctant to abandon some features of any given Immediate Object than others as the 
meaning of a term develops. There are probably a variety of reasons for this, but often 
it seems to concern a faith in the natural sciences to deliver a greater perceived 
epistemic security. The water-H2O paradigm for training budding philosophers‟ 
intuitions about rigid designation arguably relies for its intuitiveness on the way it 
straightforwardly pits the deliverances of chemistry against folk ideas about water. It 
would be interesting to compare „designation-intuitions‟ with respect to a clash 
between, say, two competing scientific theories.  
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     This reluctance, however, may come in degrees. Discussions of Twin Earth often 
seem to leave little room for acknowledging that the claim that “Water is H2O” might 
in fact be given up by chemists under the right epistemic pressure, and that the 
greatest natural scientists are notorious for recommending fallibilism of a stringency 
rarely found amongst philosophers. The model of a posteriori meaning-change 
according to which “Water is H2O” is necessarily true does not naturally suggest such 
a nuanced reluctance. The Peircean model according to which a posteriori discovery 
precisifies (the meaning of) rather than merely identifying (the referent of) a given 
term, however, does.  
     It was suggested at the start of this paper that its overarching issue would be 
realism and the nature thereof. Although Peirce collapses the distinction between a 
property and its mode of presentation in order that an epistemology of meaning should 
be in principle possible (in other words, avoiding „metaphysical realism‟), at the same 
time he avoids verificationism by keeping a notion of the Dynamic Object which lies 
behind the indeterminate meanings which concepts have for us at any particular time, 
guiding the a posteriori development of those meanings. Thus Peirce‟s is a realist 
account of meaning, though it is a form of modal realism (based in true hypothetical 
conditionals), rather than the understanding of realism in terms of ontological 




                                                 
1  The meaning of „terms‟ and „concepts‟ are discussed interchangeably in this 
paper, as it is assumed that the issues dealt with are the same in both cases. 
2  “This constitutes an essential distinction between the idea and the sign‟s sense, 
which may be the common property of many and therefore is not a part or a mode of 
the individual mind”. (Frege, 1952,  p. 59). 
3  for example, (Lewis, 1970, p. 435). 
 4  (Stalnaker, 1978), (Humberstone & Davies, 1980), (Jackson, 1997). 
5  It arguably has even deeper roots in the medieval distinction between essential 
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properties, thought of as being known a priori by virtue of understanding the nature of 
the thing in question, and accidental properties, known a posteriori. 
6  Such a separation is particularly popular amongst Australian realists. See, for 
instance, (Devitt, 1984), (Armstrong, 1997, p. 25), (Campbell, 1990, p. 27). 
 7  For a similar moral, though possibly a more jaundiced view of intuition itself, 
see (Hintikka, 1999). 
 8  To those who would protest that there must be an end-point of absolute precision 
for the process of precisification to be possible, it can be replied that although it is 
always possible to find a natural number greater than any given number, this does not 
mean that there must be a largest natural number for the process of „incrementation‟ to 
be possible. 
9  For a useful discussion of this point, see also (Skagestad, 1983, p. 276). 
10  (Schlick, 1930/31, p. 58). See also Carnap‟s paper in the same volume. 
11  Murray Murphey has claimed to the contrary that “the interpretant sign cannot 
be the meaning”, for “the whole point of pragmatism is the identification of meaning 
and habit” (Murphey, 1961, p. 316). Murphey's claim, however, can only be an 
objection to the identification of meaning with the interpretant if the interpretant itself 
cannot be viewed as a habit. For precisely this view see, for example (Peirce, 5.476). 
12  The identification of meaning and the interpretant does presuppose a certain 
optimism with respect to what may be referred to as „the spreading powers of signs‟. 
How can we be sure that every possible aspect of the meaning of a term such as „cat‟ 
will be thought somewhere, somehow? However, what would it be for this claim to be 
false, pragmatically speaking? 
 13  Again, see (Christensen & Hooker, 2001, section 3). 
14  A related form of essentialism with respect to properties identified by the 
natural sciences – specifically with respect to their causal powers – has been explored 
in the analytic tradition. See, for instance, (Shoemaker, 1984), especially chapters 10 
and 11. However it is very much a minority view. 
 15  I am grateful to Cliff Hooker for making this point. 
16  In this way, vagueness properly speaking pertains to a sign‟s interpretant not its 
object. For a good account of this intriguing issue, see (Engel-Tiercelin, 1992). 
17 An interesting parallel exists here with Keith Donnellan‟s claim that a 
description used “referentially” can in fact (remarkably) fail to be true of its referent 
(Donnellan, 1966). 
18  and, of course, corresponding possibilities, as was mentioned in section 1.3. 
19  Of course at Peirce‟s „limit of inquiry‟, a concept drawn on by his definition of 
truth (which definition, it‟s worth noting, is „pragmatic‟ rather than „nominal‟ in the 
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sense distinguished in section 2) there would be no further interpretants, and there 
meaning would seem to converge with truth. Pragmatically, however, meaning and 
truth are now and will always be discriminable, insofar as the limit of inquiry (where 
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